Ahok: Victim of a new conservative Indonesia?

Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, which is his real name, was convicted for insulting the Quran, by citing a verse at a rally for the citizens of Thousand Islands. September 27, 2016. Especially the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front, a conservative organisation, accused him of blasphemy.

@jokowi Dear mr President. How it is possible, a man like Ahok, can be convicted, in one of the largest democracies in the world?

Who is Ahok, and why several Islamic groups want him in prison? For that we need to go back to 2005. In this year, Basuki entered politics in his home region Belitung. He was elected with over 37% to become the new regent. In that time, one month after he entered office he manifested himself as a reformer. Move forward, leave the past of violence behind and develop a region of prosperity, without corruption, less bureaucracy, less traffic congestion and more job opportunities. He became quite successful, and he became popular by many.

In 2007 he resigned, and run for governor for Bangka- Belitung. The former president Abdurrahman Wahid convinced him to run for public office, and admired him for the healthcare reforms. Basuki was defeated by Eko Maulana Ali, supported by the FPI, as they never accept a Governor, from a minority population.

In 2009, Ahok became a member of the House of Representatives, for the Golkar party. In 2011, he made himself impopular to criticize the tin mining industry, for causing great environmental damage.  Youth NGO’s, supported by the FPI reported him the House of Ethics.

In that same year, he became the running mate of the current president of Indonesia, Jomo Widodo. In the second election round, they defeated governor Fauzi Bowo. Foke, as he is called by many, received a reprimand from his own Democratic Party, for joining a FPI event in 2010. He, and the Metro Jaya Police Chief Inspector General Pradopo East Pol, ate rice together with senior leaders of Habib Rizieq’s organization, at the FPI headquarters.

In 2014 when Joko Widodo took a temporary leave from his post as Jakarta governor to run for President, Basuki became the acting Governor of Jakarta from 1 June 2014. In November, that same year, Widodo became the 7th president of Indonesia, and Basuki was sworn in as the new governor of Jakarta. Since then, Basuki is a regular target by ultra- conservatives and rival candidates for being a non-muslim. Especially his minority background, made him a victim of the FPI. Several rallies were organised in the weeks of the inauguration of Basuki.

In 2016, Habib Rizieq, leader of the FPI says:  “If Jesus is the son of God, who is the midwife?” Which is, in fact blasphemy, but no one cared.

In 2017, 15 February, Basuki reached to the second round run-off between two candidates,Anies Baswedan and Agus Yudhoyono. As you might have guessed: Anies Baswedan, speeched in front of a rally, organised by the FPI. As well Agus Yudhoyon, was supported by his father, the former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyon who is,according to the media, behind the rally against Basuki, which started the accusations of blasphemy.

Strangely, on the day Basuki speeches, no one protested. A week later a video appeared, and protests begun. According to the national and international press, the video was manipulated.

It 2017, it seems the FPI finally succeeded to defeat Basuki….

Bassem Youssef under investigation for “insulting the military”

Anger at the new series of “Egyptian Jon Stewart’s” TV show reflects the country’s deepening divisions. Shahira Amin reports.

By Shahira Amin

Original article http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/10/egypt-satire-bassem-youssef/

After months away from the small screen, TV satirist Bassem Youssef is back on the air but it is uncertain how long he’ll stay. After a four month absence (Youssef’s disappearance coincided with the overthrow of Egypt’s first democratically-elected President by a military coup) he returned to the airwaves last Friday with a new episode of his weekly TV show Al Bernameg (The Programme). The episode sparked a new wave of controversy, reflecting the deepening divisions in Egyptian society.Just 48 hours after the show was broadcast, the Public Prosecutor ordered an investigation into a legal complaint against Youssef, one of several filed by citizens angered by his mockery of the military chief. Others were upset by jibes he made at the former ruling Islamists. Youssef has been accused of “inciting chaos, insulting the military and being a threat to national security.”Youssef is no stranger to controversy. He caused a stir when he mocked the now deposed Islamist President Mohamed Morsi on his show, broadcast on the independent channel CBC. At the time, several lawsuits were filed against him by conservative Islamist lawyers who accused him of “insulting Islam and the President” and Youssef consequently faced a probe by the Public Prosecutor. The charges against him were dropped several months later however. President Morsi was careful to distance himself from the legal complaints filed against Youssef, insisting that he “recognised the right to freedom of speech.” While the lawsuits did little to harm Youssef (in fact, they actually contributed to boosting his popularity and improving the ratings of the show), they did damage the image of the ousted President, who was harshly criticised for “intimidating and muzzling the press.” A couple of months before his removal from office, Morsi was accused by critics of “following in the footsteps of authoritarian Hosni Mubarak and of using repressive tactics to silence dissent.”Now, under the new military-backed interim government, Youssef finds himself in hot water again. This time the TV comedian, known as Egypt’s Jon Stewart, is in trouble for poking fun at leaked comments by the Defence Minister, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, suggesting that the General would “find partners in the local media willing to collaborate to polish the image of the military.” In recent months, Youssef has maintained an objective and neutral position vis a vis the events unfolding in Egypt. In his articles published in the privately-owned Al Shorouk daily, he has expressed concern over the brutal security crackdown to disperse two pro-Morsi sit ins in Cairo on August 14, in which hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters died. But he has also been careful to criticise the attacks on churches (often blamed on Islamists) following the coup.Friday’s episode, which marked the start of a new season for the show, focused in part on the blind idolisation of al-Sisi by many Egyptians since the coup. The word coup was never once mentioned on the programme. In one scene, Youssef is seen putting his hand over the mouth of one of his assistants in an attempt to silence him as he utters the now-taboo word. In recent weeks, calls have grown louder for the General to run in the country’s next presidential election and a group of adoring fans has even begun collecting signatures for his candidacy.The fact that Youssef is being prosecuted again after what many Egyptians consider was a “second revolution” signals that the June 30 revolt that ousted the Islamist President has failed to usher in a new era of greater press freedom .The lawsuits serve as a chilling reminder of the dangerous polarisation in the country, which some analysts warn may push it into civil war and chaos. While Youssef did take part in the June 30 protests that toppled Morsi, he has clearly decided not to take sides in this hostile environment. In an article published days before the show, he noted that many Egyptians advocate for free speech and democracy “as long as it is in their favor” but turn against you the minute your opinions differ from theirs. Aware that his episode had ruffled feathers, he sought to ease tensions with a message on Twitter that reminded his viewers, fans and critics alike, that at the end of the day, this is just “another episode in a TV show.”

Egyptian teacher faces jail for allegedly insulting Muhammad

28 May 2013 by Shahira Amin (see original post)

Dimyana Abdel Nour, a 24 year-old social studies teacher at Naga El Sheikh Sultan primary school in the small village of Tud near Luxor faces trial for insulting Islam, and risks a harsh prison sentence. Her case is the latest in a growing number of blasphemy cases against Egypt’s Coptic Christian community under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Abdel Nour was imprisoned for a week before being released on bail of nearly $3,000. She has now gone into hiding.

Three of the teacher’s students in filed a criminal complaint against her with the Public Prosecutor’s Office last month, claiming she had said that the late Pope Shenouda, former Head of Egypt’s Coptic Orthodox Church was better than Islam’s Prophet Mohammed. Mostafa Mekki, the school principal, has defended Abdel Nour, saying her other students had said the accusation was false.

“The parents of the three students who filed the complaint are extremists and have on several occasions incited hatred and violence towards Christians,” Mekki told Index On Censorship.

Mekki has been forced to cancel Abdel Nour’s temporary contract with the school in a bid to ease tensions but insists she has done nothing wrong. He has since been removed from his post as principal and was transferred to an administrative job for siding with Abdel Nour in the case. Local Christians say Mekki had received threats because of his stance.

Archbishop Sarabamon El Shayeb, Head of the All Saints Monastery in Tud described Abdel Nour’s prosecution as part of “organised repression of Egypt’s Copts”.

“The Islamists are giving out the accusations of blasphemy generously and openly, mostly against Christians,” he told Christian Science Monitor last week.

While Abdel Nour is in hiding and was absent from the trial, her lawyers and rights activists who attended the trial described the case as “unjust” saying that only the three students who had filed the complaint had been summoned as witnesses and not the other students who had denied the accusations. Abdel Nour’s lawyers also cited concerns that the rise of Islamists to power had “fueled the injustice against Coptic Christians” amid simmering sectarian tensions in the last two years.

Last year, a Coptic teacher in the upper Egyptian city of Sohag was sentenced to six years in prison for insulting Islam and the president. In September 2012, Egyptian blogger Alber Saber was also arrested and detained on allegations of having shared the YouTube trailer for the anti-Islam film “Innocence of Muslims” on a Facebook page he administers. Saber, a computer science student from a Christian family was sentenced to three years in a Cairo prison. He appealed the case and was released after paying $167 bail. His mother said that Saber has fled the country to avert being convicted a second time. Saber’s mother was forced to leave the family home and has been in hiding since after suffering harassment at the hands of Muslim extremists in her neighborhood who said her son deserved to be killed for being a self-declared atheist.

More recently, popular TV satirist Bassem Youssef was interrogated by the Public Prosecutor after several lawsuits were filed against him by ultra-conservative Salafi lawyers accusing him of “insulting Islam and the president” on his weekly show Al Bernameg CBC. The case triggered a public outcry and drew fierce criticism from Washington and rights campaigners, prompting the president’s office to release a statement saying that “the presidency is not involved in the investigation” and that it “recognises the importance of freedom of expression.”

Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression award winner Ibrahim Eissa has also been accused by an Islamist lawyer of defaming Islam after he mockingly said on his TV programme that “pickpockets would have their hand cut off according to Sharia, but those who steal billions from banks are allowed to get away with it.”

Watch: IDF detains Palestinian children and foreign citizen in Hebron

By: Mairav Zonszein Published May 2, 2013. See original post.

On Sunday, three Palestinian boys were detained by the IDF in Hebron, along with a Swedish activist who seems to have tried to calmly prevent their arrests. (Footage of the arrest is below, and highly disturbing to watch). According to the International Solidarity Movement, who put out a report on Sunday and has since been updating, the children were released a few hours later, but the Swede is still being held and attempts are being made to deport him.

According to sources from Youth Against Settlements and B’Tselem with whom I spoke, the children were detained because settlers from the extremist Beit Hadassah settlement inside Hebron complained to the IDF that they had thrown stones. One of the children is only 10, the others 11 and 12 (the age of criminal responsibility is 12).

Issa Amro, a Palestinian activist with Youth Against Settlements who has been arrested countless times for organizing and engaging in peaceful protests in Hebron’s Tul Rumeida area where he lives, told me that the arrest of children by the IDF has become a regular “phenomenon” in Hebron. He says the IDF is “pro-settler,” often arresting Palestinian residents, whether children or adults, simply because settlers tell them to – regardless of whether there is any evidence against them. He also points out that settlers are almost never detained after they throw stones, even when the soldiers are standing right there. Issa added: “These arrests do not stop violence, on the contrary, they feed violence more and more in the long term.”

According to Ynet, the Swedish activist was arrested because he tried to steal a soldier’s weapon and resisted arrest – however the first video below makes both those accusations appear false, although he clearly made an effort to stop the soldiers from taking the children. (It is also well known that the IDF tries to deport foreign citizens living and documenting life in the West Bank). I contacted the IDF Spokesperson several times in recent days to hear its side of the story, but have yet to receive a response.

According to B’Tselem, the children were investigated at the Kiryat Arba police station with an adult present, and released 3-4 hours later. The Swedish activist is reportedly still in Israeli custody and trying to avoid deportation.

The first video below, published by Youth Against Settlement, shows one of the children and the Swede being arrested. Below that is a video filmed by an member of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) showing the arrest of one of the other children at the same time. Needless to say they are very disturbing, and no one in Israeli media is giving it any attention.

 

Syria’s second revolution?

Source: JoinRevolution Miswiyati-v

Women stand to be emancipated in more ways than one.

A story relayed to me by the editor of this fine publication has it that an elderly woman in Homs used to leave her house each morning and, on her way to the local bakery, encountered Syrian Army soldiers standing by their tanks. She knew very well who these men were but without fail would greet them with a polite “Shalom.” This went on for several days. Finally, one of the nonplussed soldiers was given to inquire: “Grandmother, why do you pass by us every day and say ‘Shalom’?” The elderly woman replied: “Oh, you speak Arabic? You’re Syrians? I thought you were Israelis,” before continuing on her way to her daily bread.

It’s a shame that the term chutzpah is not more commonly associated with Arab feminism. In a week that has seen the passing of one Iron Lady, and the decidedly softer agitprop of Ukrainian mammaries, it’s worth remarking on one of the least addressed yet perhaps most significant aspects of the Syrian revolution; namely, how important women have been to it and how important it has been for them.

Typically characterized in the Western press as grieving widows and childless mothers – bit players in an overlong masculine tragedy – Syria’s women have been prime movers in the two-year-long struggle for emancipation, which carries a double meaning in this context. Women have led the earliest demonstrations against the regime, they’ve chronicled the uprising and its repression in vivid detail, they’ve coordinated humanitarian relief efforts, and they’ve taken up arms. Judging from what I’ve witnessed of the extensive reconstruction planning being undertaken by the Syrian diaspora, women have also been the best organized and most willing to bypass the pettiness and factionalism that have stunted their male counterparts. (Martin Amis’ notion of a “gynocracy” is especially intriguing in light of the Muslim Brotherhood.)

Any reckoning with a post-Assad society will necessarily be a reckoning with the status conferred on half the population. Two worthwhile projects that are trying to redefine that status merit discussion. The first is called Syrian Women at Work, which is sponsored by the Syrian-American Alliance and does exactly what its name suggests. Women refugees in Antakya, Turkey are given jobs in the handcrafting of fabric bric-a-brac for sale in the United States. (This charity was started by my friend Mahmoud Elzour, of whom I’ve written extensively over the past year; it was he who first suggested to the young male activists of liberated al-Bab that they needed to include women in all spheres of emerging municipal governance.) In much the same vein, Syria’s Future Lies in the Hands of Its Women is the nicely titled initiative being underwritten by the new NGO Watan Syria. This organization is teaching 200 refugees in Reyhani, Turkey basic computer skills, nursing, social advocacy, and foreign languages. It’s also putting them to work making garments and accessories for sale abroad. The idea, as relayed to me by Mouna Hashem, one of Watan’s volunteers, is simple: professional autonomy is the only way to stop the horrors of auctioned-off child-brides and coerced prostitution that have added misery upon misery for the ever-growing number of female refugees. “Syrian women are so resilient and strong,” Hashem told me. “They want representation in every aspect of the political and economic sectors in Syria.”

By representation, Hashem means something other than the sham sexual equality peddled by the Assad crime dynasty, founded as that has been on the presence of women in elite positions in the regime. Bashar’s mother Anissa is to this day thought of a combination between Lady MacBeth and Connie Corleone, and I suppose there still must be people out there who believe that Bouthaina Shaaban testifies to social progress under Ba’athism more so than Leni Riefenstahl did under Nazism. By contrast, the extremities of war have allowed for, if not demanded, a dramatic reconsideration of traditional gender roles.

Razan Zeitouneh, the de facto leader of the Local Coordination Committees and the recent recipient of a prize named for Anna Politkovskaya, told Al-Arabiya: “At the beginning of the revolution, I heard young men shouting ‘Al-Bayt lil neswan’ (Women should stay home), and now I hear them say ‘Hayyou ‘alaeneswan’ (Cheer for women).”

“This revolution also freed us from the tyranny of our homes,” Amina Ahmed Abid told Newsweek in describing her leadership of inaugural protests in Latakia.

Abid’s husband had sought to keep his own head well below the parapet but didn’t dare restrain his spouse from risking hers. Farah Nasif, a liberal Damascene explained that the feminine garb of the pious had now become a useful prop in the underground: “We’ll wear a hijab to look like the local women if we’re heading to a conservative area. I hide medicine, sometimes money, in my pockets and in my clothes, and I don’t really get any questions.” As for the men who remained confined to their homes, Nasif was mordant: “I am happy for this. Keep men in the home and kitchen.”

Can it be a coincidence that the most prominent Alawites who have given the lie to the notion that opposing the regime is an inherently ‘sectarian’ action have also tended away from the y-chromosome? Feminist novelist Samar Yazbek chronicled the protest movement only to discover she had become a part of it.

She fled Syria in 2011 after being given a guided tour of one of the regime’s torture dungeons and warned that what she saw there awaited her if she didn’t shut up. (Her PEN-winning memoir of the first months of the uprising, “A Woman in the Crossfire,” came out last year.) Despite being called a ‘whore’ and a ‘black stain’ on her sect, Yazbek has gone back to tour the liberated areas, putting her life at further risk. Joining her is Loubna Mrie, a 21 year-old Alawite whose father, Abu Muntazer, is – or was – a shabiha assassin. After participating in protests in Latakia, Loubna appeared in an online video, her face thinly disguised by the Syrian Independence flag she used as a bandana. She compared the ruthlessness of her own sect to that of the Salafists, who have been cast as the drivers of anti-Assad sentiment. As she later recounted on Facebook, her father “went to his brothers, cheered them up, and told them that he washed the shame that his daughter brought to Jebel al-Akrud” by murdering his own wife. Honor killings, it seems, are also the purview of ‘secular’ dictatorships.

Indeed, the regime’s well-documented sexual violence is clearly more than the psychotic outcroppings of totalitarianism. The horrifying industry of rape in Syria may target both men and women but it’s the latter’s case to not only shame and traumatize the individual but to “break the family,” as Lauren Wolfe of Women Under Siege phrased it in a haunting piece for The Atlantic. Husbands and sons are meant to turn against their ‘tainted’ wives and mothers such that society simply cannot be reconstituted. This is an actual war on women with nihilism as the intended endgame. Little wonder that some have chosen to fight back.

Em Joseph is a nom de guerre taken from a popular Syrian television mini-series that belongs to a 40 year-old rebel profiled by Time’s Rania Abouzeid as a Levantine Maid of Saragossa. She’s not afraid to tell the men to leave the real dirty work to the deadlier of the species:

Here, she’s one of the boys, and she’s as tough — or tougher — than most of them. She is a respected member of the unit, somebody the men say they are proud to fight alongside. “She’s a sister of men,” one of her comrades says, using a common Arabic phrase for a strong, independent woman. “She raises our morale,” says another, Walid. “When we see her in front of us, we push forward. May God keep her,” he says before offering her a hearty slap on the shoulder, the kind of slap a man might give another man, but not one a man would give a woman in a community where many women will not shake hands with a man they are not related to. Em Joseph was married only briefly and has no children; her parents are alive and live nearby. When asked what they thought of her fighting, she responds, “God willing, I have raised their heads high.”

It’s worth noting that Em Joseph fights for Suqoor al-Sham, a popular Islamist brigade in Idlib that is party both to the Syrian Liberation Front – a loose consortium of rebel formations that, although lacking a coherent ideological platform, espouse a vaguely defined Salafist-nationalism – as well as to the U.S.-backed Supreme Military Command. I have no idea of what Em Joseph’s own politics are, but let us assume that once the war is over some of her bolder comrades-in-arms will eschew the hearty back-slapping and hosannas only to turn their attention to that brief marriage and that conspicuous lack of offspring. Will a Kalashnikov- and grenade-wielding veteran of air base raids find it necessary to submit to the misogyny of the blowhard clerics and politicians her bravery helped bring to power, or will she be emboldened to defy them as she did the Assadists?

The case should not be overstated that a violent conflict, particularly one set in the Middle East, is the cask in which the equality of the sexes can fully mature. Hamas has long managed to define female militancy in its Qassam Brigades as just another expression of a woman’s duty-bound domesticity. But there is at least now an opportunity, even if it has been forged in hell, for a second revolution in Syria to follow from the first. That is no small thing.

(NOW)

Riot police deployed around St Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, Egypt

By Shahira Amin. See original post

Cairo’s central district of Abbassiya was tensely calm on Monday as riot police deployed around St Mark’s Cathedral, scene of violent clashes between Coptic Christians and Muslims the previous day. A Copt was killed and more than 80 people were injured in Sunday’s clashes, the latest in a spate of deadly sectarian violence that has rocked the country in recent days. Four Copts and one Muslim were killed by gunfire in weekend clashes in the town of Khosous, north of Cairo after a group of Coptic Christians spray-painted offensive drawings on the walls of an al Azhar-affiliated building in the town. The trouble in Abbassiya meanwhile erupted when Coptic mourners (who had been attending a funeral service for the four victims of the violence in Khosous) came under attack as they left the cathedral. The Christian mourners had reportedly chanted anti-Muslim Brotherhood slogans , prompting an angry reaction from Muslim residents of the neighbourhood, who hurled rocks and molotov cocktails at them. Loud blasts were heard as riot police fired tear gas and water cannon to disperse the crowd.

President Morsi has condemned the violence, promising an immediate investigation into the incident. Copts who gathered outside the cathedral on Monday however,expressed skepticism that the perpetrators of Sunday’s attack would be brought to justice.

” We have yet to see justice done in previous assault-cases on Christians ,” said Hani Kirolos , a pharmacist. “If anything, it will be the Christians who get arrested.”

“They (the Muslim Brotherhood) want Christians to leave the country but we are not going anywhere,”said Mary Toma, a Coptic housewife.

Sectarian tensions that have been brewing for years have escalated since Islamist President Mohamed Morsi came to power with increased attacks on churches and physical assaults against Coptic Christians who make up an estimated 12 per cent of the population. Egypt’s Christians however, have not been the only group targeted in recent months by Morsi’s Islamist supporters. The country has seen intermittent violence between Islamists and liberal opposition activists demanding an end to Muslim Brotherhood rule. In recent weeks, simmering tensions between Morsi’s Islamist allies and Al Azhar have also boiled over, pitting Islamists against one another.

A controversial draft law that would allow the government to issue sukuk ( Islamic bonds ) has inflamed longstanding tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and al Azhar, placing Sunni Islam’s highest authority on a collision course with the Islamist group ruling the country. Grappling with a burgeoning budget deficit , the Muslim Brotherhood is seeking sukuk as a new source of finance to ease the current economic crisis but al Azhar has said its scholars must be consulted over the proposed law before its issuance by the Shura Council (the Upper House of parliament currently responsible for issuing legislation). A provision in Egypt’s new Constitution stipulates that” al Azhar scholars must weigh in on matters related to Sharia law” but it remains unclear if the scholars’ decisions are binding or merely consultative.

Friction over the draft law is part of a wider conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Azhar as competition between them intensifies over religious authority in the ‘new’ Egypt.. Since the January 2011 uprising, al Azhar has sought independence after longtime state control, striving to assert its role as “the voice of moderate Islam.”

Last week, thousands of protesters rallied in Egyptian cities to express solidarity with the Grand Sheikh of al Azhar Ahmed El Tayeb amid increasing calls for his dismissal by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and fears that the Muslim Brotherhood would try to “Ikhwanize” the institution (a term used to refer to the appointment of Muslim Brotherhood members or their supporters in state institutions with the aim of controlling them.) The protests in Cairo, Luxor (the hometown of the Grand Sheikh ) and other cities came in response to earlier protests by hundreds of Azhar students angered by a case of mass food poisoning on campus . The students accused the University Management of negligence and called for those responsible for the poisoning to be held to account. An exchange of accusations followed: In a widely circulated rumour on social networking sites Facebook and Twitter, opposition activists accused the Muslim Brotherhood of involvement in the food poisoning incident which they claimed was meant ” to discredit the Grand Imam and have him replaced”. Essam El Erian, a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood ,in turn criticized Sheikh Tayeb saying that the mass poisoning was “the result of old corruption at the university” and urging the Grand Sheikh to introduce “real change.’

The latest unrest will likely further isolate the ruling Islamists amidst growing opposition to the Morsi regime. The recent dismissal of a Salafi Presidential Advisor for allegedly “misusing his public post for illegal benefit” has fueled tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood President and ultra-conservative Salafists who had initially backed him. The hardline Islamists appear to have switched loyalty in recent months, unifying ranks with the liberal opposition and intensifying their criticism of the President. In a so-called ” national reconciliation initiative” announced in January, the Salafis echoed calls by the liberal opposition for a change of government, amendments to the constitution and the selection of a new Public Prosecutor– piling pressure on Morsi to fulfill those demands.The growing rift between Morsi and the Salafis is certain to weaken the Brotherhood’s chances of securing majority seats in the next legislative election which has been postponed indefinitely by the Supreme Constitutional Court. But the Salafi-opposition alliance may prove even more dangerous than that as it can only spell dire consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood.

 

Yulia Tymoshenko: the truth about Shcherban’s murder is important to society

Yulia Tymoshenko’s appeal to the media 

by Yulia Tymoshenko (see original post)

Dear friends!

I am forced to ask you to come to the Ukrzaliznytsia hospital in Kharkiv on Sunday, April 7, 2013.

I ask that you be present while the staff of the Kachanivska prison again forges a statement of my alleged “unwillingness” to go to court in Kyiv because only your presence can help stop the avalanche of false information.

 

I hope the prison management will let you in to see me and won’t interfere in your professional duties to record what will take place in the Ukrzaliznytsia hospital room before the questioning of the next witness in the Shcherban case.

If this happens, you will see that the video the regime has released has been edited and doesn’t reflect my position.

I want to again explain the difference in my attitude towards participation in the court proceedings in Kharkiv and Kyiv.

Let me remind you that in the fabricated case being heard by the Kyivsky District Court of Kharkiv I am charged with a number of imaginary “crimes” involving VAT refunds related to the activities of UESU at a time when I wasn’t even working in the corporation but was a member of parliament.

These charges from the 1990s were politically motivated – revenge for my opposition activities and participation in the Ukraine Without Kuchma movement.

The Prosecutor General’s Office and courts have repeatedly recognized the absurdity of these charges, and more than 50 judges of both chambers of the Supreme Court closed the case on 11 November 2005.

Given the Supreme Court decision in the UESU case it’s clear that it was reopened illegally, in gross violation of paragraph 7 of Protocol №7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 61 of the Constitution of Ukraine regarding the permanence of court decisions. It should therefore be closed immediately and not subject to further review.

At the court hearing in the Kyivsky District Court of Kharkiv on 22 March 2013, my defenders voiced my motion regarding the review of this case in my absence and the need to close it immediately. I am still a patient in Central Clinical Hospital № 5 and don’t see any reason to do irreparable harm to my health during the transport and participation in the hearing of this absurd case in the Kyivsky District Court of Kharkiv.

The severity of my health problems, according to Article 249 of the CPC of Ukraine (1960), don’t allow me to be present at the hearing scheduled for 12 April 2013.

However, given the severity of the charges that Yanukovych’s regime has fabricated in the other politically motivated case – the Shcherban case – I continue to demand that I be personally present in court for the questioning of all witnesses. In spite of the critical state of my health and hospital treatment, I again stress that I am willing to be transported to Kyiv.

The regime is trying to illegally and without evidence give me a life sentence in the bogus Shcherban case. At the insistence of the PGO, using my status as a patient in Kharkiv hospital CCH № 5, violating Article 225 of the CPC of Ukraine (2012), based on acts forged by the Kachaniska prison management regarding my alleged “unwillingness” to go to the Kyiv court, they continue to question witnesses in my absence.

In response to the fabricated act of my “refusal”, the false evidence given by alleged “witnesses” based on the words of third-fourth-fifth parties or the deceased, there should be my word, because I plan to prove the absurdity of the government’s fictitious charges of my complicity in this serious crime despite my health problems.

I hope that you, dear journalists, will be at the Ukrzaliznytsia hospital on Sunday while the prison administration is drawing up the so-called “refusal” act and can present my position.

The truth about my relationship to the Shcherban case is important not only for me, but for all of society.

Yulia Tymoshenko
Ukrzaliznytsia Hospital
Kharkiv
5 April 2013

The Syrian Opposition: Perception and Reality

Due to the recent news I would like to share this article (already written in 2011 but still actual)

by Oscar Assadullah Mukhtar Bergamin

 

The National Council of Syria (NCS), a loose umbrella organization of groups opposed to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, will meet Oct. 1 in Turkey to discuss whether to request the establishment of a U.N.-backed no-fly zone over the country similar to the one that played a critical role in the ouster of Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi.

Demonstrations and violent crackdowns by the al Assad government have convulsed the country since the Arab Spring began, and the opposition group is looking to convince potential foreign backers that the collapse of the ruling minority Alawite regime is imminent. But the reality of the situation is much more nuanced: The opposition itself is highly fractured and is operating under heavy constraints.

The geopolitical trends in the region work against the al Assad regime in the long run, but the opposition is ill-equipped to achieve its goals on its own. The movement will be hard pressed to find the level of external support needed to force regime change. While the regime maintains considerable strength, it likewise is operating under significant constraints, and at this point neither the regime nor the opposition has the ability to overwhelm the other, which will leave Syria consigned to a state of protracted conflict for the foreseeable future. Key to understanding this dynamic is an assessment of the Syrian opposition.

Evolution of the Protests

Syria saw hints of unrest in early February, but it was not until mid-March that the protests became more commonplace, when a small group of protesters attempted to organize demonstrations in Damascus through Facebook. The Syrian regime was quick to pre-empt and clamp down on those protests, but a new uprising emerged March 18 in the southwestern city of Daraa, a concentration of rural Sunnis with ties to Sunni tribes and religious groups across the Iraqi and Jordanian borders.

While Daraa was the scene of the most violent unrest and crackdowns, demonstrations began to spread rapidly to the Damascus suburbs, Latakia (where a large number of Alawites are concentrated), Homs, Hama and the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli. Protesters began replicating the Daraa model of protest, whereby they attempt to circumvent government detection by organizing by word of mouth rather than by social networking websites. Pro-regime forces responded by cutting off the city’s electricity and water supply and blocking the delivery of food. Daraa has since remained relatively quiet and locked down.

However, the regime then faced bigger problems in the Sunni strongholds of Homs, Hama and Jisr al-Shughour. As the protests moved into these Sunni areas, the Syrian regime concentrated its resources in the key urban population centers of Damascus and Aleppo, where security forces were quick to disperse protesters. The Syrian regime, relying mostly on the Republican Guard, the 4th Armored Division, and the 14th and 15th Special Forces divisions — all of which are composed of Alawites — along with armed plainclothes shabbiha militiamen and riot police, attempted to replicate their crackdown in Daraa in the cities of Baniyas, Hama, Latakia, and Homs, among others, but with limited success.

Despite the regime’s efforts, Syrian security forces simply do not have the resources to overwhelm the protesters — as Iran was able to during its protests following the 2009 presidential election controversy. Indeed, Syria has been reluctant to deploy more demographically mixed army divisions for fear of causing more severe splits within the armed forces, thereby overstretching the mostly Alawite units. (Rather than deploy the military to all reaches of the country, the regime has been tracking persons of interest with human and signal intelligence, then raiding those homes on a case-by-case basis.) At the same time, the regime benefits from the fact that Syrian minorities — Alawites, Christians and Druze, who form the economic elite; the Kurds; and a select group of Sunnis that the al Assads have incorporated into their patronage network — have not yet shown the willingness to join the demonstrations and transform Syria’s fractious protest movement into a veritable revolution.

Makeup of the Opposition

There are factions of the opposition that operate both inside Syria and outside. The external opposition is highly fractured, composed of people who cannot account authoritatively for the reality on the ground.

The protests on the ground consist primarily of young and middle-aged men, though women and children are also present at times. The largest protests materialize after Friday prayers, when participants congregate on the streets outside mosques. That is not to say protests are relegated solely to Fridays; a number of demonstrations have been held on other days of the week but on a smaller scale. These protests also consist of men, women and children of all ages.

But the opposition is ideologically diverse. A key element of what is considered Syria’s traditional opposition — groups that have long been opposed to the regime — is the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which the regime has demonized throughout the unrest. In 1976, the Syrian MB began an armed insurgency against the Alawite regime, led at the time by al Assad’s father Hafez. By 1982 the group was crushed in the notorious Hama massacre that allegedly killed some 30,000 civilians. The MB was driven underground, and dissenters in other Sunni majority cities, including Jisr al-Shughour, were quickly stamped out.

Today, the Syrian MB remains a key participant in the opposition movement, but its capabilities inside Syria are weak. Syrian MB leader Ali Bayanouni resides in exile in London, and the Syrian MB outside Syria has become increasingly involved in the external opposition movement, participating in conferences such as the NCS conference in Istanbul in late August.

However, the Syrian MB is unable to maintain much influence in Syria due to a limited presence inside the country, and it would take a concerted effort on the part of the Islamist group to earn the trust and fellowship of other Syrians. Since the banning of the Syrian MB in 1980, al Assad’s regime has been quick to blame the organization for militant attacks as a means of instilling fear of the MB among Syrian citizens. Christians, Alawites, and even other Muslims are weary of groups of a conservative Sunni group gaining political influence in the regime.

Opposition has also traditionally been found in Syria’s mostly Kurdish northeast due to the Kurds’ long-standing grievances against the regime, which has denied the group basic rights and citizenship. The Kurds have taken part in conferences led by the external opposition, such as the NCS meeting in Istanbul. Protests have meanwhile occurred in Kurdish majority cities such as Darbasiyah, Amuda, and Qamishli, but they have not reached the scale of unrest as those in Sunni-concentrated areas. The Kurds and Sunnis may share the desire for regime change, but once the goal of regime change is achieved, whoever is in power, aside from the Kurds, will seek to contain Kurdish separatism. There already have been indications that Kurdish representatives among Syria’s protest movement are being excluded from the process of drafting demands.

The Syrian MB and the Kurds are two of several groups that have tried to coalesce, without much success, into a more substantial opposition force inside Syria in recent years. These groups took advantage of the Syrian regime’s weakened position following the withdrawal from Lebanon in the spring of 2005 by drafting and signing the Damascus Declaration in October of the same year. Written by Syrian dissident Michel Kilo, the declaration was a statement of unity calling for political reforms. Declaration signatories include the Kurdish Democratic Alliance in Syria and the Kurdish Democratic Front in Syria. The Syrian MB was originally part of the Damascus Declaration, but internal disagreements led the MB to distance itself from this opposition movement in 2009. Disunity among the opposition remains to this day.

Despite the disconnect between the external and internal opposition forces, some progress is being made to bridge the gap. Of the various councils formed by opposition members outside Syria, the NCS has recently emerged as the only council that has received the support of the Local Coordinating Committees (LLC), a group that claims to unite roughly 120 smaller coordinating committees across Syria. The NCS was selected by a diverse committee of independents, leftists, liberals, and Kurds and claims that roughly half of its members, which include grassroots activists and traditional opposition supporters, are based inside Syria.

In the past, the LLC and many other internal Syrian opposition groups, fearing competition, have been quick to denounce the formation of these external councils. Although many logistical constraints of uniting the external and internal opposition persist, the fact that the LLC has pledged support for the NCS and called upon the Damascus Declaration parties and Kurdish leadership to do so mean this should be watched as a potential sign of the opposition gaining coherence.

Tactical Overview of the Protests

Opposition groups — and thus protests — inside Syria remain relatively small and localized. Protests rarely involve more than 500 participants, and they take place in the cities or areas in which the participants live. Typically, the protests are short, lasting no more than half an hour, though in exceptional cases like Hama, protesters have numbered in the thousands.

Coordinating these protests is a challenge for the opposition movement. Since mid-March, most of the coordination has been conducted by local coordinating committees operating within Syria. Opposition members insist coordination is improving with these entities, which are responsible for planning protests in their respective communities. These committees use Facebook to designate the theme of an upcoming protest. STRATFOR sources claim that liaison officers in many cities and towns report directly to a command center in Ashrafieh, a Christian sector in Beirut. They receive instructions on the timing of the demonstrations from there, and they send images of the protests and police brutality to the center.

To curb what interface there is among the groups, the al Assad regime has tightened controls on the country’s communications, especially Internet communications. This is especially true on Fridays and Saturdays, when bigger protests are more likely to occur. But in this regard the regime is careful not to overstep its boundaries. Shutting down communications in full would compromise the Sunni business class’ support for the regime. In addition, the regime uses communications to its advantage by identifying members of the opposition.

After 40 years under authoritarian rule, many Syrians possess the technological savvy to find ways around the regime’s communications controls. Syrians have found ways to communicate internally via the Internet or cell phone, and some have posted video recordings of the protests to the Internet. It also likely that they have learned methods of avoiding detection from opposition groups in the Middle East, not to mention the fact that there are a number of open source tools available on the Internet to help avoid detection.

They also use more traditional means to coordinate their activities. Locations such as local mosques or neighborhood stores or tea houses are useful meeting points because they are common places where most Syrians tend to frequent on a given day. Opposition members use couriers to pass messages between each other, and likely employ other covert measures, such as drop spots, when necessary.

Why Syria is Not the Next Libya

There are four main reasons why Syrians working towards the overthrow of the Assad regime cannot expect to replicate the experience of the Libyan rebels, who were able to carve out an independent territory of their own early on in their uprising, then received significant external support in their fight against Moammar Gadhafi. The first problem is that there is no “address” for the Syrian opposition, to quote U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. There is no one overarching body that the international community can recognize as the alternative to the Assad regime, but several competing organizations that speak with different voices. Though Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) has proven not to have been a true representative of a united Libyan opposition in recent weeks, it did serve as a unified symbol of opposition to Gadhafi for several months. All of the disparate rebel groups that fought against Gadhafi pledged loyalty to the NTC until the fall of Tripoli and resultant power struggle began to expose its internal divisions.

The second problem for the Syrians is geographic. Their country cannot provide the sort of safe-haven that the Libyan rebels had from the beginning of the rebellion in the east (and later in Misurata and the Nafusa Mountains). No safe-haven means no place to amass forces for training, nowhere to store weapons sent in from abroad, and nowhere to form a de facto political capital in Syria. Though Turkey has at times issued empty threats about creating a buffer zone on its border, thus far none of the other neighboring countries have hinted that they would ever consider providing any sort of haven across the border.

The third problem is that unlike in Libya, where there were mass army defections in Benghazi and elsewhere in the east at the onset of the uprising, this never happened in Syria. Whereas Libyan defections were numerous and began just days after the start of the uprising, Syrian army defections took months to gain momentum only became more frequent in late June, and even then defectors did not contain large numbers of top commanders. The Syrian soldiers defected to form the Free Syrian Army but their size and strength remain unknown — they are believed to number in the hundreds, and are largely sequestered on the Turkey-Syria border. Only recently has the Free Syrian Army claimed to have a battalion stationed near Homs, though this has not been independently verified.

The fourth problem has to do with the lack of desire among the countries that could serve as external patrons of the Syrian opposition to have Syria’s destabilization spread across the region. Libya may be right across the Mediterranean from Europe, but it is much more isolated than Syria is in the heart of the Levant. Regime change in Libya does not create nearly the same sorts of prospective problems in the region as the toppling of the Alawite regime in Damascus would.

War of Perceptions

There are two sides to every war, and the war of perceptions in Syria is no exception. Through state-run media agencies, the al Assad regime has portrayed the opposition as armed terrorists while depicting military personnel as peacekeepers who attack only when provoked. The regime has accused foreign states of using the unrest to divide Syria, playing to the population’s fear of foreign meddling. It also has downplayed or denied rumors of officials having resigned in response to the government’s handling of the protests, and it has vilified those who report contradictions of its official statements.

For its part, the opposition is also crafting a version of the story in Syria, the bulk of which originates from two sources: the Syrian Revolution General Commission, purportedly an umbrella group for 70 percent of the more than 200 local coordinating committees operating within Syria, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Both groups operate from abroad and claim to play a role in coordinating the protests. Rami Abdel Rahman, the head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reportedly leads a group of some 200 activists throughout Syria; he claims to maintain contact with his sources through Skype, Gmail and phones with unregistered numbers. However, the degree to which these two groups actively coordinate the opposition is questionable, given that they do not operate in the country.

What is unquestionable is their role in reporting on the opposition inside Syria — reports that picked up by mainstream and Western media. LCC avail themselves to the media and actively post developments on Facebook in Arabic and English. Through these outlets, the LCC present updates on casualty counts, the whereabouts of the military and abductions of opposition figures — unsurprisingly, these figures conflict with those of the regime. They have also alleged that security forces surround hospitals to prevent wounded protesters from receiving medical treatment, and that they have stormed several schools. These reports, like those from the regime, should be viewed with skepticism; the opposition understands that it needs external support, specifically financial support, if it is to be a more robust movement than it is now. To that end, it has every reason to present the facts on the ground in a way that makes the case for foreign backing.

Conflicting storylines do not conceal the fact that the opposition is very unlikely to overwhelm and topple the regime without substantial foreign military and financial backing. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have a long-term interest in restoring Sunni power in Syria, but are more concerned about the short-term cost of sectarian spillover and provoking Iranian retaliation as Tehran seeks to maintain its strategic foothold in the Levant. Unlike Libya, Syria is unlikely to be the recipient of foreign military intervention. In fact, U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford explicitly said that the situation is “a Syrian problem and it needs Syrian solutions,” and that the opposition must “figure out how to win away support from the regime, and not look to outsiders to try and solve the problem.”

Small-scale logistical support is most likely under way already. External opposition groups that support Syria accept donations and membership dues, though much of this money goes to sustaining themselves rather than to support an uprising in Syria. To move money, Syrians use a Hawala network, a remittance system that operates outside traditional banking or financial avenues. Such a system is ideal for the opposition because there are no wire transactions to be tracked or smuggled currency to be found. It also makes difficult to quantify exactly how much money is being transacted.

The opposition remains largely nonviolent. This is likely a strategic move; maintaining a nonviolent image allows the opposition to appear sympathetic to would-be foreign backers when the regime cracks down on protesters. But it is also a tactical decision in that the opposition will not engage in a war it knows it cannot win.

However, there are some elements within the opposition who believe they will never receive external support and seek to arm themselves. This especially true among some within the youth faction, who argue that they do not need to maintain a nonviolent image and they should obtain weapons and counter the regime offensive before the Syrian regime has a chance to take advantage of regional distractions to intensify its crackdowns. In theory, weapons and equipment should be relatively difficult to procure inside Syria — most of the country’s arms were confiscated after the anti-regime uprising in Hama in 1982 — but porous borders, highly functional smuggling networks, and a region awash in military hardware make weapons acquisition less problematic than in other areas of the world. Before that happens, they must receive substantial covert backing, and there is no evidence to suggest this is happening.

Without foreign backing, the opposition movement is unlikely to acquire enough money or gain enough traction to acquire large quantities of weaponry, let alone achieve regime change. The movement is simply too small and too ill equipped, and it is unlikely that foreign powers will come to the Syrian opposition’s aid. As the opposition and the regime continue to shape the perceptions of the reality in Syria, the developments there will continue to be stalemated, regardless of how they craft their narrative. If the regime is to face a meaningful threat to its stability in the near term, that threat is far more likely to emanate from Alawite divisions within the regime than with the opposition in the streets.

Interview: Frank Beuken tells Al Rasub about the Arab Spring

Original interview at Al Rasub

Frank Beuken is a Blogger   and a political analyst, he talks to Al-Rasub about his coming novel and changing political conditions of Arab world..

 

Al-Rasub:     Frank, can u  tell us briefly about your younger years and school College life .

Frank Beuken:  I was born in Baarn, The Netherlands. I have seen many schools as my parents moved quite a lot. Several places in the Netherlands, France and Belgium. High school was my highest grade. Due to severe problems at home I ran away and lived temporary in a shelter home. I first tasted freedom when I lived in a town called Nijmegen in the Netherlands. I became active in protests against government decisions which were undermining normal civil rights. As well against American weapons to be place in the Netherlands. I spent many of these years in the so called underground culture of the town. Evenings were filled with philosophical discussions with friends which lasted often till the next morning.

 

Al-Rasub:     You have a very close look on Arab Spring, will you explain the context of Arab Spring ?

Frank Beuken:    From the first moment in Tunisia when a boy set himself on fire out of pure frustration against the authorities, my attention for the Arab spring was born.

Of course I was always against suppression and followed the news in Romania 1989 when the dictator Ceausescu was captured and shot by a military tribunal. The people of that country suffered for many years just because one man “owned” the country and found he had the right to abuse the people. With fear for their lives, young people, supported by miners dared the stand up against this cruel man. With the fast that 1 of 5 men in Romania had served the Securitate (Secret services) they were never sure who to trust. But they won with the right spirit.

In Tunisia the young people found the strength to stand up as well and they succeeded. Egypt followed, then Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and many more countries. The young people just had enough of these cruel dictators. All they wanted was respect, jobs and a normal future without fear.

 

Al-Rasub:    How do you think Arab spring gets its targets ?

 

Frank Beuken:  The Arab spring was already very successful. Several dictators fled or were killed. The people took back what belongs to them. The country itself. It is now important to stay focused. A good example is Egypt now with Mursi, who wants to get more power than Mubarak had. Maybe his intentions are good and does he really wants to protect the revolution but it is unacceptable for the people on Tahrir square. Many of their friends died or are in prison. Mursi needs to listen to them. Not to Tantawi, who in my opinion is still very much in power. Often I wonder if Mursi is a puppet from the army and with this idea, a democracy is still far away. And the youngsters on Tahrir are aware of this.

 

Al-Rasub:     There is a common perception in many groups in Muslim world that Arab Spring is American funded moment, what are your observation and opinion ?

 

Frank Beuken:   Personally I think it is the biggest offence for all these young people who have given their lives for the revolution. The first real proof that America couldn’t be in control, when Obama mentioned the resign date of Mubarak. But it didn’t happen. Mubarak stayed in charge. Obama lost his face with this awkward moment. People who believe that foreign powers have set up the Arab spring, are conspiracy thinkers. People who always believe that higher powers are behind it. The Arab Spring is pure and started and finished by these brave young people.

 

Al-Rasub:    Some critics says that Arab spring divided Muslim world or specially Arab world in two groups, Liberal and Fundamentalist and they give the examples of Tunisia and Egypt what you think ?

 

Frank Beuken:  These critics are often people from the west, with a huge lack of knowledge of the Arab world. Remember that Ben Ali, Khadaffi, Mubarak and now Assad as well, always mentioned the danger of fundamentalists? They wanted to warn the nation for a fear what doesn’t really exist. I mean of course there are extremist groups but they do not have the power to set the revolution in their direction. Personally I believe Al Qaida is a myth. In a sense that it isn’t a worldwide terroristic group. Every extreme group uses the name Al Qaida to impress the world. Fear is a tool to make the nation to believe in their leader, to protect them against evil.

 

Al-Rasub:     What will be or should but the outcome of Arab spring like moments ?

 

Frank Beuken:    To my opinion this isn’t an issue what will be solved in one or two years. Of course the expectations of the western world are probably the same as the people in the Arab world. We all hope that democracy is installed within a short time. That is the ideal world but unfortunately, reality is otherwise. People lived for over 30 years under suppression. Most of the people, survived by adapting them to the system. And for most families, the basic things are important: A home, a job, to be able to feed your family. Now everything is turned upside down. Suddenly the oppressor is gone. Security forces fell apart and people feel liberated. But then, reality of all day life comes around: Homes, jobs, feed the family etc. To be honest, I think it will take up to 30 years to have a full stable country again. Don’t forget; most people think the same way: Freedom. But still there are many groups who are still either supporting the former dictator or groups who want to take over control. Also these people need to be given a place in the new society. They cannot be ignored, as they are there. It will take a full generation before the whole consensus is a fact.

 

Al-Rasub:   What kind of lessons can be learned from Arab spring, especially in Muslim word.

 

Frank Beuken:   The revolutionaries must stay focused until the end. They have to stay alert until  a democratic constitution is established and protected.

 

Al-Rasub:    Tell us something about your Books and what inspires you to write a book ?

 

Frank Beuken:  With all the information and all the conversations I had with revolutionaries from Egypt, Tunisia and Libya I felt to do something. To write a book was a long time wish from my and what subject was better than the Arab Spring. What I did is I combined the protests in a novel. It is a story based on the Arab Spring. The reader will experience the protests in the streets, social behavior and to see a world which is so different than west Europe but so very much alike as well. After all, we are all human beings. This book is an ode to the young man, or the young girl in the middle of the freedom fights. The book is written in my language, Dutch, but soon it will be available in German and English. Inshallah soon in arab as well.

 

Al-Rasub:    What keep you busy during your free time?

 

Frank Beuken: Since August I started to write a new book. Again a novel in which east meets west. Still I talk a lot with people from “the arab spring” countries.

 

Al-Rasub:   What are your future projects on which you are working or you want to work?

 

Frank Beuken:   As said, my new book of course. Secondly, my wish for next year, is to meet the people I had contact with in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria.

 

Al-Rasub:  Your message for our readers ?

 

Frank Beuken:  Believe in mankind. Stay focused and let’s unite because, we are in a far majority compare to small extremist groups who want to tell us how we have to live. So we can win and make this world a better place for all. Respect, dignity, peace and a future for all.

 

 

 

Frank Beuken can be reach at:

www.frankbeuken.com

info@frankbeuken.com

Gaza Conflict Test for Egypt’s Morsi

 

 

Shahira Amin, Egyptian journalist, the former deputy head of Egyptian state-owned Nile TV and one of its senior anchors

By Shahira Amin for RIA Novosti

CAIRO, November 20 – As the shelling of Gaza continues and the civilian death toll rises, Egypt’s Islamist President Mohamed Morsi may face increasing pressure at home to take firm action against Israel. If that happens, Egypt might find itself drawn into a conflict that the country neither has an appetite for, nor the resources with which to fight.

In recent days, Morsi has engaged in talks with international leaders and diplomats to contain the potentially explosive crisis and stave off further bloodshed.

His talks with the Qatari leader Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al Thani and Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo on Saturday focused on “a ceasefire proposal for a longer lasting solution to the problem,” a source close to the talks said.

Morsi has also consulted exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and Ramadan Shallah, the leader of Islamic Jihad, a militant group in the Palestinian coastal enclave.

Morsi’s measured response and choice of a diplomatic approach over the military option for dealing with the escalation has surprised some skeptical observers, who had anticipated nothing short of “use of military force” by the Islamist President. After all, the Israeli offensive was a chance for the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Morsi hails, to act on their frequent and often intense anti-Israeli rhetoric.

Not only has there been no muscle-flexing on the part of the Egyptian President, but Egypt has also played a pivotal role in the ongoing multilateral mediation effort between Hamas and Israel – one that could soon lead to a breakthrough, according to Morsi.

While post-revolution Egypt enjoys closer relations with Hamas than the Mubarak government did (and hence, may have better chances of succeeding in mediating a truce), Egypt’s newly-elected President has so far avoided direct contact with Israeli officials – a factor likely to complicate matters as Egypt works to secure a ceasefire agreement.

If the Israeli strikes continue much longer, Morsi will face increasing pressure from Egypt’s newly-politicized public – including revolutionary forces and Islamists – to revise, or scrap altogether the peace treaty with Israel and to permanently open the Rafah border crossing to ease the suffering of Gaza’s 1.5 million residents.

The border has been partially open in recent days to allow wounded Palestinians into Egypt for medical treatment. In recent days, Morsi has sent a convoy of much-needed humanitarian aid to Gaza but he has stopped short of providing military aid to Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood from which he hails. In the meantime, Morsi has not threatened to sever diplomatic or commercial ties with Israel.

Analysts say the Israeli offensive is a test for Egypt, whose security cooperation is vital to enforce the thirty-year-old Peace Treaty with Israel and restore stability in the Sinai region.

It also comes as Egypt is embroiled in its own domestic issues including economic decline, high unemployment, a precarious security situation in Sinai that has kept tourists and investors at bay and differences between liberals and Islamists over the role Islamic Sharia law will play in the new Egypt.

Both Israel and Hamas have expressed a willingness to commit to a diplomatic solution but have also said they were prepared to continue to fight if no truce agreement was reached. They have each put forward their conditions for an end to the hostilities. While Hamas wants the blockade on Gaza permanently lifted and is seeking an end to the targeted killings of Palestinian military leaders, Israel has demanded guarantees that Hamas will halt the rocket attacks from Gaza and the neighboring Sinai Peninsula.

In recent months, Jihadi militants have attempted to launch cross-border attacks into Israel from neighboring Egypt. Egyptian military and police forces in Northern Sinai have also been targeted in similar violent attacks.

In the latest in a series of deadly assaults since the start of the year, three police officers were killed when gunmen ambushed a police patrol in El Arish earlier this month. In August 2012, 16 Egyptian border guards were killed when Jihadi militants attacked their outpost as they were breaking their Ramadan fast.

The Israeli onslaught which began on Wednesday and is soon to enter its second week, was triggered by the firing of Hamas rockets from inside Gaza into southern Israeli cities and towns. Longer-range rockets targeting Tel Aviv have also been intercepted.

Since the outbreak of the latest round of violence, hundreds of rockets have been fired into Israel, over 250 of which have been knocked down by Israel’s Iron Dome air defense System. Israeli sources said 120 rockets were fired on Monday alone, nineteen of which were stopped by Iron Dome. Meanwhile the death toll in Gaza from nearly a week of Israeli shelling has reached 110, with hundreds more injured.

Shahira Amin is an Egyptian journalist, the former deputy head of Egyptian state-owned Nile TV and one of its senior anchors.